he Pakistan army's invasion of the Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan this week brings few surprises. For years observers in Washington and Brussels have been pressing for an assault on this scale. The army says its aims in Operation Rah-e-Nijat ("Road out of Misery") are to finally eliminate the main sanctuary for the Taliban and al-Qaida in Pakistan and, according to army chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the foreign and local "elements" that given them succour.

The army has fought several wars in Waziristan over the past five years ¨C only on each occasion to be given a bloody nose and compelled to sign ceasefires that emboldened the Pakistani Taliban.

Naturally, there is more to this situation than immediately meets the eye. For independent observers such as journalists and aid organisations, gaining an accurate picture of events on the ground is not easy. Like the armies of Israel and Sri Lanka earlier this year, the Pakistan army has prevented journalists and other independent observers from travelling into the affected areas. According to its public relations office, 78 militants and seven members of the security forces have been killed. In contrast, Taliban spokesperson Azam Tariq made the pearl jewelry unlikely claim that only one of their fighters had been killed thus far.

The truth looks to be another victim of this latest battle, and sadly there are plenty of those. More than 200,000 have fled the fighting in scenes reminiscent of earlier army operations in the Swat valley and Bajaur tribal agency in the north. "The mass migration is causing big problems for the people [of towns immediately outside Waziristan like Tank and Dera Ismail Khan]," explains senior local aid consultant Dr Marwat. Given that the total population of South Waziristan is at most 700,000, this is a massive dislocation.

Since July last year much of South Waziristan has also been laid waste by daily ground and air bombardments by US and Pakistani forces. Already 12 civilians have been reportedly been killed while fleeing the war zone. Although the army claims to have gone to great lengths not to harm civilians, in the past there have been many reports of civilians being killed and subsequently described as terrorists. In Swat, it is believed that up to 90% of those killed were civilians. Whether they will perish in similar numbers in Waziristan remains unclear.

Less uncertain are the divisions among the insurgents. Rifts between the Pakistani Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud and warlord allies of the Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar have been exploited by Pakistan's security agencies. An agreement was reached last Saturday under which members of the Ahmedzai clan (one of eight major clans of the Wazir tribe that dominates North and South Waziristan), under the control of warlords Haji Nazir and Gul Bahadur, will support army troops against forces loyal to Hakimullah, himself from the Mahsud clan. In return the army will limit its attacks on areas under their control.

The agreement, reached in secret and passed over by most major news outlets, has army commanders confident of biwa pearl speedy success in the Waziristan operation. It also suggests that Pakistan has not severed contact with Afghan Taliban forces. In truth, it has little other option at present and Washington's protestations will count for little unless and until the army feels it has regained influence over this lawless frontier region.

Still the question remains, once the guns have been silenced will Pakistan take steps to cleanse the tribal areas of the extremist poison? Perhaps such questions are premature. The battle still rages and Waziristan is an insurgent's dream. Being remote and with its dense foliage, craggy mountains and limited infrastructure, it has proved an ideal stronghold for local Taliban.

"The terrain is much more difficult than [that Pakistan forces encountered] in Swat," says Mansur Mahsud of the Fata Research Centre, who is himself from South Waziristan. Unlike Swat, which was part of Pakistan proper and close to major cities, Mansur adds, Waziristan is surrounded by other hostile tribal areas and there is much local support for warlords such as Hakimullah who hail from this region. The Pakistan Taliban movement was born here in 2007, although even before then jihadi groups throughout the tribal areas and North West Frontier Province invoked the Taliban label in their battle against the Pakistan state.

That the Waziristans sit immediately on the porous border with Afghanistan makes them a perfect launching pad for Taliban forces into Afghanistan and Pakistan. Along with remote Balochistan, the Waziristans are the least integrated parts of Pakistan and tribalism and terrorism have proven excellent foils for populations mired in poverty and deprivation. It is important to remember that as the rush to celebrate the liquidation of hitherto mysterious Taliban commanders ensues.

You cannot help wondering, though, if all of akoya pearl this is a giant "drama" ¨C as one American businessman with investments in the oil fields of the tribal areas told me recently. Local and foreign observers wonder why the army is not invading Bahawalpur or Dera Ghazi Khan in the heart of the Punjab, where young men are daily recruited into the jihad.

Most ominous of all is the spectre of increased attacks in Pakistan's major urban centres. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak, and the Taliban know of only one way to respond: through high-profile violence that will claim many innocent lives. As the Taliban loses its grip on the ideological and political framework of the Islamist insurgency in Pakistan, however, new outfits, particularly those drawn upon sectarian lines, can be expected to fill the breach. The attack on army headquarters by the anti-Shia Jaish Mohammad last week may be a signal of this disturbing trend.